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SITUATION V. 
BLOCKADING BY MINES. 
There is war between States X and Y. Other States 
are neutral. War vessels of State X are blockading a 
port of State Y. Tvvo of the war vessels of State X are 
called away, leaving only two to aid in maintaining an 
effective blockade. The two remaining vessels lay a line 
of automatic contact mines of vvhich they give notice to 
neutrals. 
The neutrals protest on the ground that this is not a 
legiti1natemethod of blockade and maintain that themines 
should be re1noved. 
What action should be taken~ 
SOLUTION. 
Under the strict law such use of 1nines is not prohibited.' 
It vvould see1n, however, that mines should not be used 
for the maintenance of a commercial blockade and that 
neutrals would have good cause to protest against such 
use, whjch protest a belligerent should heed. 
NOTES ON SITUATION V. 
Effective blockade.-According to the Declaration of 
Paris, 1856, to which n1ost States acceded "blockades, in 
order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, 
maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to the 
coast of the enemy." This principle has been so generally 
recognized as to be little questioned. The words '' suf-
ficient force" have received varied interpretatjons. It is 
not certain just what constitutes a "sufficient force," nor 
of vvhat character such force must be. Sir Alexander 
Cockburn, in the case of Geipel v. Smith, said: 
In the eye of the law a blockade is effective if the enemies' ships are 
in such numbers and position as to render the running of the blockade 
a matter of danger, although some vessels may succeed in getting 
through. (Law Reports, 7 Queen's Bench, 404.) 
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The definition of blockade, according to the armed neu-
tralities of 1780 and 1800, spoke of its maintenance by 
vessels. '"fhe Declaration of Paris of 1856, however, men-
tions "a sufficient force" not defining the nature of the 
force. · 
Treaty provisions.- Article 13 of the treaty between the 
United States and Italy of 1871 contains the. statement 
that those States-
Being desirous of removing every uncertainty which may hitherto 
have arisen respecting that which upon principles of fairness and jus-
tice ought to constitute a legal blockade, they hereby expressly declare 
that such places only shall be considered blockaded as shall be actually 
invested by naval forces capable of preventing the entry of neutrals, 
and so stationed as to create an evident danger on their part to attempt it. 
There may in some cases be a doubt as to what might 
properly constitute "naval forces capable of preventing 
entry of neutrals." Some maintain that there may be 
question of the propriety of the use of mines for such pur-
' pose; others regard mines as legitimate as any form of 
naval warfare, 'Yhether for blockade or other service. 
Opinion of court.-ln the case of the Oircassian in 1864, 
Mr. Justice Chase said, in regard to blockade: 
It may be made effectual by batteries ashore as well as by ships 
afloat. In the case of an inland port, the most effective blockade would 
be maintained by batteries commanding the river or inlet by which it 
may be approached, supported by a naval force. sufficient to warn off 
innocent and capture offending vessels, attempting to enter. .(2 \Val-
lace, U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 135.) 
Obstructions in aid of blockade, stone.-Speaking · in 
1862 of the stone placed in Charleston Harbor to aid in 
maintaining the· blockade and of the opposition raised by 
some European States to this method, Secretary Seward 
in a letter to Minister Dayton, at Paris, said: 
Hitherto such o bstructi~ns have been regarded as an ordinary mili-
tary appliance of war. No American ever conceived that the human 
hand could place obstructions in a river which the same hand could not 
remove. * * * We were, therefore, surprised, and even incredu-
lous, when we saw that the placing of obstructions in the channels 
leading to Charleston was, in Europe, regarded as an act of peculiar 
and ruthless severity. (U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, 
p. 316.) 
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In a letter two days earlier to Mr. Adams, 11:r. Seward 
said: 
I am not prepared to recognize the right of other nations to object to 
the measure of placing artificial obstructions in the channels of rivers 
leading to ports which have been seized by the insurgents in their 
attempt to overthrow this Government. I am, nevertheless, desirous 
that the exaggerations on that subject which have been indulged 
abroad may be corrected. I have, therefore, applied to the Navy 
Department for information, and I have now to inform you that between 
the channels leading to the harbor of Charleston which have been so 
obstructed there still remain two other channels, neither of which has 
been so obstructed, and in which there has been no design to place any 
artificial obstructions. These are the Swash channel and a part of the 
so-called 11affit's channel. These two latter channels are guarded, and 
passage through them prevented only by the blockading naval forces. 
(Ibid., p. 36.) 
In 1884 certain Chinese harbors \vere in part blocked by 
stone. In a co1nmunication to the Secretary of State at 
this ti1ne the United States minister to China says: 
On the lOth of January I was informed by the British minister, Sir 
Harry Parkes, and the German charge d'affaires, Count Tattenbach, 
that dispatches had been received from their consuls at Canton saying 
that the Chinese authorities were preparing to obstruct the water 
approaches to Canton, and that the effect of these obstructions would 
be to imperil, if not to prevent, navigation. The German consul 
reported that \Vhampoa would be "totally blocked." 
I telegraphed :Mr. Consul Seymour for information, and his reply I 
inclose. Mr. Seymour, as you will observe, said that there would be-
"serious obstructions without equivalent benefits." * * * The 
United States during the rebellion saw fit to obstruct the channels in 
Charleston Harbor by sinking ships laden with stone to secure an 
effective. blockade. Germany during her latest war with France pro-
tected her Balt:ic ports with torpedoes. I should have felt some embar-
rassment in seeking to persuade the yamen that what Germany and 
the United States regarded as honorable warfare could not be permitted 
to them. (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1884, p. 66.) 
A later dispatch, No. 267, from Secretary Freling-
huysen says: 
Even, however, under this favorable modification (the opening of 
channels 100 to 150 feet in width) the obstruction to the channel at 
Canton and Whampoa can only be tolerated as a temporary measure, 
to be removed as soon as the special occasion therefor shall have passed, 
and under no circumstances to be admitted as a precedent for setting 
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<>bstacles to open navigation at the treaty ports in time of peace , under 
pretext of being intended for ultimate strategic defense in the con t in-
gency of future war. (Ibid., p. 96.) 
A dispatch of Secretary Bayard to Mr. Denby, United 
States minister to China, July 28, 1886, says: 
Your No. 141 is before me, and brings to the Department, with much 
·clearness, a question of great interest. It is unquestionable that a 
belligerent may, during war, place obstructions in the channel of a 
belligerent port, for the purpose _of excluding vessels of the other bellig-
€rent which seek the port either as hostile cruisers or as blockade run-
ners. This was done by the Dutch when attacked by Spain in the 
time of Philip II; by England when attacked by the Dutch in the 
time of Charles II; by the United States when attacked by Great 
Britain in the late civil war; by Russia at the siege of Sebastopol; and 
by Germany during the Franco-German war of 1870. But while such 
is the law, it is equally settled by the law of nations that when war 
-ceases such obstructions, when impeding navigation in channels in 
which great ships are accustomed to pass, must be removed by the 
territorial authorities. Such is the rule apart from treaty; and it was 
implicitly admitted by Mr. Seward, when, in replying to the re-
monstrances by the British Government on the placing by the block-
:ading authorities of obstructions in the harbor of Charleston, he stated 
that these obstructions were placed there merely temporarily. Were 
there any doubt about this question, which I maintain there is not, it 
would be settled by the provisions of our treaties with China, which 
virtually make Canton a free port, to which our merchant ships are 
-entitled to have free access in time of peace. · You are therefore in-
structed to make use of the best efforts in your power to induce the Chi-
nese Government to remove the obstructions in the Canton River, 
which, as you state, operate to close the port of Canton to the merchant 
vessels of the United States. 
In sending to you this instruction, I affirm the instruction of Mr. 
Frelinghuysen to Mr. Young, No. 267, dated April18, 1884, printed in 
the Foreign Relations of that year. (U. S. Foreign Relations 1886, 
p. 95.) 
Professor Moore summarizes the Chinese action in the 
Chino-Japanese vvar of 189_4 as follows: 
During the war with Japan in 1894, the Tsung-li yamen announced 
the closure of Foochow for purposes of defense. One entrance was 
left open, and a place was designated as an anchorage for foreign and 
Chinese steamers outside the mouth of the river, where they were 
required to discharge and load cargo, which was conveyed to and 
from Foochow by lighters registered at the customs. These lighters 
followed an indicated route and plied only in the daytime. In report-
ing these measures, the American charge at Peking observed that, 
102 BLOCKADING BY MINES. 
burdensome as they doubtless would prove to be, no objection could 
be made to them in view of the demoralization of the Chinese naval 
forces, Foochow being an important naval depot which must be 
·guarded at all hazards. The Government of the United States re-
affirmed the position taken by Mr. Frelinghuysen in his telegram to 
Mr. Young of January 22, 1884, and by J\1r. Bayard, in his instruc-
tions to Mr. Denby of July 28, 1886. (7 Int. Law Digest, p. 858; 
U. S. Foreign Relations 1894, Appendix I, p. 71.) 
Obstructions in aid of bloclcade, sunken vessels .-Pro-
fessor Lawrence, writing of the Russo-Japanese war of 
1904, said: 
In the present war no one, even in Russia, has hinted that the 
Japanese went beyond their rights in attempting to block the channel 
leading to the inner harbor of Port Arthur by sunken merchantmen, 
or in mining the sea pathway which they had observed the Russian 
ironclads to take when going in and coming out. (vVar and Neutrality 
in the Far East, 2d ed., p. 104.) 
Use of mines during blockade.-Sir Thomas Barclay 
says of the general use of mines at Port Arthur: 
During the blockade of Port Arthur, the Russians laid mines in all 
parts of the sea adjacent to that port. The Japanese allege that from 
the beginning to the end of the siege they removed 395 Russian mines. 
The removal continued after the siege, so that the total number re-
moved they estimate to have much exceeded this number. In an 
excellent article, dated November 24, 1905, published in the Times of 
December 27 , the able Tokyo correspondent of that paper remarked 
that " this chapter of history would not have retained a prominent 
place in general recollection, had it not been vividly illustrated from 
time to time by shocking disasters to merchant steamers, which, while 
navigating routes comparatively remote from the scene of the com-
bat, struck errant mines, and were sent to the bottom.'' The Russians 
were not alone the offenders. The Japanese made almost equally 
extensive use of such mines, as has been learned from a document 
compiled at the Japanese Hydrographers' Office in answer to an appli-
cation from the Russian headquarter staff for information as to the 
locality of any mines placed by the Japanese jn the neighborhood 
of Vladivostok. The Japanese Admiralty replied, says the same cor-
respondent, by a detailed statement showing that two mine-laying 
operations had been carried out by the Japanese in Vladivostok 
waters-the one in April, 1904, to render impassable the entrance and 
exit through the straits which must be passed to reach the port; the 
other, about a year later, when the Baltic fleet had arrived in Far 
Eastern waters. In this case 715 mines were laid ''right across Peter 
the Great Bay, from Askolcl Island to Korsakoff Island, a distance of 
forty miles ." These figures show that there must ha,re been a mine at 
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about every 100 yards. "In spite of this great plexus of destructive 
engines,'' communications with Vladivostok continued undisturbed 
during the period of eight months-from April 15, 1905, when the 
Askold-Korsakoff line was laid, to November 9 of the same year-when 
the Japanese Admiralty replied to the Russian inquiry. (Problems of 
International Practice and Diplomacy~ p. 59.) 
Discussion of the use of mines at the Hague Conference; 
1907 .-In the letter of instructions as to the Second 
Hague Conference, Sir Edward Grey says to Sir Edward 
Fry in regard to mines: 
15. His J\1:ajesty's Government would view with satisfaction the 
abandon1nent of the employment of automatic mines in naval war-
fare altogether. Failing the acceptance of such a total prohibition, 
they earnestly hope that the einployment of these engines of war will 
only be sanctioned under the strictest limitations. They would advo-
cate an arrangement by which the use of automatic mines should be 
limited to territorial waters, and, if possible, to such portions of terri. 
torial waters as adjoin naval bases or fortified ports. All mines thus 
employed should be efft:ctively anchored, and so constructed that, in 
the event of their breaking adrift, they would either automatically 
become harmless or sink, and that in any case their active life should 
not exceed a limited period of say six months. (Correspondence Re-
specting the Second Peace Conference, Parliamentary Papers Misc. 
No. 1 (1908) [Cd. 3857].) 
Various questions were raised as to the meaning of 
any prohibition of the use of mines for the maintenance 
of a blockade. Great Britain proposed an article to the 
following effect: 
L'emploi de mines sous-marines automatiques de contact pour 
etablir ou maintenir un blocus de cmnmerce est interdit. 
·The British proposition became the poinf of departure 
for discussion on this topic. It was asked whether such 
a regulation 'vould prohibit the use of mines by the 
blockading fleet for its own defense, etc. Captain Ottley 
replied that the intent was to prevent the closing of a 
great commercial port by the exclusive use of a .line of 
mines. The president of the commission, M. Hagerup, 
said that two main questions seemed to be raised: 
1°. Les batiments etablissant ou maintenant un blocus pourront-ils 
employer des mines pour leur defense personnelle? 
2°. Peut-on etablir un blocus de commerce uniquement a l'aide de 
mines? Tout le monde parait etre d'accord pour repondreinegative-
ment ala seconde question. 
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The discussion in regard to the use of automatic con-
tact mines introduces the conflict of interests between 
neutral and belligerent. The belligerent of large re-
sources, ample military forces, varied and extended 
commercial interests would naturally desire that these 
should have the greatest freedom in use. The belliger-
ent of small resources~ both commercial and military, 
would naturally desire to use the most economical means 
of defense and to use these means with the least possible 
restraint. Some of the States having less military re-
sources regard mines as essential to their protection 
against the more powerful and as a possible means by 
which they can close the ports of the great powers. 
Neutrals may also be involved in many ways. This is 
to some extent shown in the remarks of the Italian dele-
gate, Captain Castiglia, at the opening of the discussion 
on the subject of submarine mines at the Second I-Iague 
Conference, June 27, 1907: 
L'emploi des mines est un moyen de defense auquel ne pourront 
jamais renoncer ni les grancles puissances qui ont une longue etendue 
de cotes a proteger, ni, a plus forte raison, celles ·qui ne possedant pas 
une grande n1arine de guerre trouveront dans l'emploi de ces armes un 
puissant auxiliaire a leur defense maritime. 
C'est la defense la 1noins couteuse et pour cela elle est a la portee de 
tous. Mais si l'on pense aux desastreuses consequences que ces in-
struments de guerre peuvent causer au commerce pacifique des neutres 
et a l'exercice de la peche, pendant et meme apres la guerre, c'est 
bien naturel que l'on cherche a mettre quelque frein dans l'usage de 
ces terribles instruments pour en eliminer les consequences fatales. 
l\1ais les types des mines adoptes sont si differents, et les cas particu-
liers de leur emploi sont si nombreux, que meme avec toute la meil-
leure bonne volonte, il serait impossible de dieter des regles generales 
pouvant etre toujours sui vies fidelement. 
La defense sous-marine ideale dans le sens de ne produire aucun 
dommage aux navires des neutres est celle qu'on obtient avec des ob-
structions composees de mines fixes, que des observateurs font eclater 
moyennant l'electricite. lYfais l'emploi de ces mines est non seule-
ment limite pres des cotes, mais aussi il n'est pas toujours possible. 
Sir Ernest Satow, speaking before the Third Commis-
sion at the Second Hague Conference, on September 17, 
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1907, said of the amended form of the British proposition 
to absolutely prohibit blockade by mines: 
L'article 4, alinea 3, declare qu'il "est interdit de placer des mines 
automatiques de contact d-evant les cotes et 1es ports de I 'adversaire 
dans le seul but d'intercepter 1a navigation de commerce." C'est la 
une clause qui laisse au belligerant une echappato:i!'e bien dangereuse. 
On avait propose dans 1e Comite de ne permettre 1a pose de mines 
devant un port de commerce qu'a 1a condition qu'i1 y eu.t dans ce port 
au moins une grande unite de combat, mais 1a proposition fut vive-
ment combattue et dut, par consequent, etre retiree. Cependant il 
serait, a notre avis, tout a fait contraire a 1' esprit et a la lettre de la 
Declaration de Paris de permettre qu'un b1ocus fut maintenue totale-
ment ou en partie a 1'aide de mines. Je me permets de vous rappeler 
1e texte meme du passage qui a trait a cette question-"les blocus, 
pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectiis," c'est-a-dire maintenu 
par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement I 'acces du littoral de 
1'ennemi. II est clair qu'il s'agit ici d'une force suffisante composee 
de navires de guerre, et que 1'on ne peut comprendre dans cette cate-
gorie des mines sous-marines, qui ne sont sujettes a aucun controle, et 
qui ne contiennent en elles aucune preuve evidente de 1 'intention de 
fermer l'acces du port bloque. II serait par consequent bon de tirer 
ce point au clair, afin de ne 1aisser subsister aucune equivoque, et 
c'est pourquoi nous avons l'honneur de proposer le texte suivant a la 
place de celui que nous avons sous 1e~ yeux. 
It was recognized in the discussions of Article II of the 
convention relative to the laying of automatic contact 
submarine mines that the introduction of the last clause 
would introduce possible complications. The article is 
as folloV\rs: 
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and ports 
of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping. 
According to the last clause the prohibition extends to 
the mines laid with the "sole object of intercepting com-
mercial shipping." This introduces the question of in-
tent, which is ahvays difficult to prove. The intent is, 
however, restricted by the introduction of the adjective 
u sole" (le seul but) . 
The report of the subcommission vvhich had the matter 
of automatic contact mines under consideration vvas as 
relates to the question of blockade by mines as follows: 
ART. 4. Devant les cotes et les ports de leurs adversaires, les belligerants 
peuvent placer des mines automatiques de contact amarree.(l dans les limites 
·indiquees aux deux articles precedents 
106 BLOCKADING BY MINES. 
Toutefois, ils ne peuvent depasser la limite de trois milles marins devant 
les ports, qui ne sont pas des ports de guerre, que s'il s'y trouve des Ctablis-
sements de constructions navales ou de radoub, appartenant a l' Etat. 
Il est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact devant les 
cotes et les ports de l' adversaire dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation 
de commerce. 
Apres avoir fixe des limites a 1a defense des cotes, le reglement 
s'occupe dans l'article 4 de l'attaque. Les deux premiers alineas de 
cet article se rapportent aux limites que, dans l'espace, les belligerants 
doivent garder en posant des mines anlarrees devant les cotes ennemies; 
le troisieme alinea y apporte une nouvelle restriction, c'est que meme 
la, ou devant les cotes ennemies on peut placer dans la zone des deux 
premiers alineas, des mines amarrees, on ne peut pas en placer ''dans 
le seul but d'intercepter le cmnmerce." 
1) Occupons-nous d 'abord de cette derniere disposition. Elle doit 
son existence a une proposition britannique, contenue dans le projet 
primitif de la Delegation de Grande-Bretagne et portant que "il est 
interdit d'e1nployer des 1nines sons-marines automatiques de contact 
pour etablir OU Inaintenir Un bloCUS de COlllnlerce.'' 
Dans la Sous-Cmnmission, M.le Contre-A1niral Arago fit remarquer, 
qu 'avant tout il serait necessaire de deterrniner la portee precise de 
cette disposition. '' Interdit-elle par exemple aux vaisseaux bellige-
rants, qui etablissent un blocus, tout usage de mines sous-marines, 
me1ne pour leur defense propre , OU, au contraire, a-t-elle SeJJlement 
pour but d'interdire l 'etablissement d'un blocus a l'aide d'un cordon 
de Inines SOUS-Inarines place devant une cote ennemie?", a quoi M. le 
Capitaine de Vaisseau Ottley repondit ''que la pensee a laquelle 
cette diRposition s'est inspiree, etait !'interdiction a Un belligerant de 
fenner un . port de commerce de son ennemi par l'emploi de mines 
automatiques de contact." 
Devant cette position de la question on dut se deinander, si la d~s­
cussion de la proposition britannique n'outrepassait pas les limites de 
la cmnpetence de la 3eme Commission. On fit observer que la question 
de savoir quant et comment un blocus peut etre etabli, est du ressort 
de la 4eme Cmn1nission, qui aurait a s'occuper de la matiere du blocus 
de guerre; c'est nota1n1nement a la 4eme Commission qu'il devrait 
apparteni_r de se prononcer sur toute question concernant_l'effectivite 
du blocus. Apres un echange de vues au sein de la Sous-Con1mission, 
le President put constater l'unanhnite de la Sons-Commission a ne 
s'occuper que de l'une des face~ que presentait la proposition britanni-
que; il s'agirait seulement de determiner, en examinant les mines, 
cmnme moyen de nuire a l'ennemi, si l'on peut s'en servir dans le but 
de barrer la navigation commerciale de l'adversaire-question a 
laquelle, paralt-il, on devrait repondre negativement. Cela etabli, on 
pourrait confier au Comite le soin de bien fai~e ressortir cette pensee 
commune, tout en laissant hors de discussion !'application, au sujet 
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de l'emploi des mines, des principes de la declaration de Paris concern-
ant l'effectivite du blocus. 
C'est en effet dans cet ordre d'idees que le Comite eut a s'occuper de 
la proposition anglaise. On commen~a par etre d'accord sur ce point, 
que, pour se soustraire a tout equivoque, il fallait abandonner le terme 
de blocus, employe dans cette proposition. 
This Article 4 subsequently was amended and became 
Article 2. 
ART. 2. Il est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact 
devant les cotes et les ports de l'adversaire dans le seul but d'intercepter 
la navigation de cornmerce. 
Opinions of text writers.-There have been claims that 
the blockade of ports must be wholly by war vessels. 
Fauchille says of this subject: 
En general, les traites qui ont ·precede la declaration de Paris (voir 
notammment traites de 1780 et 1800) ne precisaient point- la nature 
des vaisseaux qu'on pouvait employer dans un blocus. La declaration 
de 1856, elle-meme, est restee muette sur ce point; seulement !'abro-
gation de la course qu'elle a prononcee ne peut permettre aucun doute 
a cet egard. Cette derniere observation s'applique egalement aux 
conventions posterieures a 1856. Les lois interieures des Etats sont au 
contraire plus explicites su~ la question: la plupart reconnaissent 
expressement le principe qu'un navire de gnerre seul pent cortstituer 
un blocus: nons citerons notammment !'ordonnance des Pays-Bas du 
26 janvier 1781 (art. 6)~ les ordonnances suedoises du 21 janvier 1804 
(§XI) et du 8 avril 1854 (§ 4), Ies reglements danois du 1er mai 1848 · 
(§ 1) et du 16 fevrier 1864 (§ 1), le reglement de la Prusse de 20 juin 1864 
(§ 1), !'ordonnance autrichienne du 3 mars 1864 (§ 1), et c~lle du 21 
mars 1864 (§ 5), le reglement russe de 1869 (§ 7) et les instructions 
fran~aises du 2p juillet 1870 (art. 7). L'Institut de droit international, 
qui,. dans sa derniere seance, a essaye de codi:fier les lois du blocus, a 
aussi declare formellement que l'acces du port bloque devait etre 
interdit au moyen de vaisseaux de gnerre. (Du Blocus Maritime, 
p. 132.) 
Fauchille also says of the opinion expressed at the 
meeting of the Institute of International Law in 1877 
(Annuaire 1878, p. 110) in regard to the difference be-
tween blockade by ships or by coast batteries or tor-
pedoes which render access to the port impossible: 
Nous crayons done que l'en1ploi de torpilles, nullement defendu par 
la declaration internationale du 11 decembre 1868, est legitime pour 
former nn blocus lorsque leur disposition est telle qu'elle permet un 
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investissement effectif. Et il en sera ainsi, si, outre l'escadre volante, 
il se trouve devant la cote ennemie des vaisseaux dont les torpilles sont 
entre elles a une distance telle que leur puissance explosible puisse 
embrasser tout 1 'espace de mer qui les separe d u vaissea u qui les porte 
ou qui s'etend entre chacune d'elles. (Du lllocus :Maritime, p. 134.) 
Fauchille says of the propriety of blockade by sinking 
vessels loaded with stones before the blockaded port: 
Pour resoudre cette question il faut, ce nous semble, envisager 
plusieurs hypotheses: Supposons d'abord qu'outre la ligne de pierres 
il se trouve devant le port une escadre de vaisseaux en nombre suffisant 
pour avertir tous les navires etrangers de !'existence du blocus. En 
-ce cas, le blocus par pierres sera-t-il legitime? Nons devons faire une 
djstinction. De deux chases l'une: Ou bien la ligne de pierres est une 
ligne ininterrompue et alors ce mode de blocus.n'est pas legitime. En 
-effet, quoique bloque, un port ne se trouve point pour cela fenne a 
tous les vaisseaux etrangers: selon !'usage international, certains 
batiments peuvent encore sortir du port durant les premieres semaines 
du blocus, et meme pendant la duree de l'investissement la place 
reste toujours accessible a certains navires particuliers; or, avec le 
systeine que nous ~upposons, comment ces vaisseaux pourraient-ils 
penetrer dans le lieu bloque ou s'en eloigner? Ce serait chose im-
possible, car, en verite, on ne peut obliger la flotte bloquante a ouvrir 
un passage dans la ligne de pierres a chaque fois qu'un de ces batiments 
voudrait passer! Ou bien, au contraire, la ligne de barrage n'est pas 
ininterrompue et renferme certains passages; le blocus par pierres est 
alors parfaitement legitime, puisque ces passages, sans empecher 
l'effectivite du blocus, permettent I' entree ou la sortie de laplace aux 
batiments qui ont ce droit. Ces passages, disons-nous, ne rendent pas 
le blocus non effectif, attendu qu'ils sont connus des seuls vaisseaux 
bl<?quants, et que ces vaisseaux bloquants sont supposes etre en nom-
bre suffisant pour avertir les neutres, les visiter et poursuivre ceux qui 
resisteraient a leurs ordres. 
Cette premiere hypothese est purement theorique, jamais elle ne se 
realisera dans la pratique, car elle n'offre au belligerant bloquant aucun 
:avantage special. Un blocus par pierres ne sera applique par un 
Etat qu'autant qu'il presentera pour celui-ci une certaine utilite, et il 
n'offrira quelque utilite que s'il necessite pour son existence l'emploi 
d'un nombre de batiments moins considerable que le blocus par vais-
.seaux stationnes. Pour examiner si un semblable moyen est vraiment 
legitime, il faut done supposer qu'il n'y a devant la place a.insi cerne 
que quelques rares croiseurs insuffisants pour prevenir de !'existence 
du blocus tousles navires qui se presenteraient. Or, dans ce cas, une 
objection nouvelle s'eleve aussitot. De nombreux navires pourront 
echapper a la surveillance des croiseurs; ignorant !'existence du 
blocus, ils s'approcheront sans crainte du port bloque, et ils iront se 
briser sur la ligne de pierres qui ferme !'entree de la place: des dam-
mages considerables seront ainsi infliges a des innocents. Un pareil 
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resultat ne peut, ce nous semble, permettre aucun doute sur la legiti-
mite d~ systeme qui l'entraine. Ce systeme n'est done, comme l'a 
dit le president des Etats confeder6s, Jefferson Davis (:Message du 12 
janvier 1863), qu'une "odieuse barbarie." Certes, aucune definition 
ne pouvait mieux convenir au blocus par pierres qui fut etabli en 1861 
par les Americains, puisque ceux-ci avaient declare n'y recourir que 
parce qu'ils ne possedaient pas une flotte suffisante pour constituer, 
avec des navires, un blocus effectif. (Du Blocus :Maritime, p. 144.) 
Pradier-Fodere agrees vvith Fauchille that the mainte-
nance of a blockade by coast batteries is allowable, citing 
a treaty between France and Denmark of 17 42, the Ger-
man code, and other sources. He also says: 
La seule regie en cette matiere est que les blocus, pour etre obliga-
toires, doivent etre effectifs, c' est-a-dire main tenus par une force su:ffi-
sante pour interdire reellement l'acces du littoral de l'ennemi: or, les 
matelots et les soldats qui desservent les batteries constituent bien une 
fo~ce, et si cette force est suffisante pour interdire l'acces du littoral, 
l'entree ou la sortie des ports, il est difficile de ne pas dire qu'il y a la 
un blocus effectif, quoique, a la verite, les blocus maritimes soient le-
pius generalement constitu€s et maintenus par des forces navales. 
Les blocus par batteries placees sur les cotes sont une exception a la 
maniere ordinaire de bloquer, mais ne sont pas une exception a une 
regie qui n'existe pas, et, des lors, il n'y a pas lieu d'appliquer les 
principes de !'interpretation. 
Les memes observations doivent etre faites, et la meme solution doit 
etre clonnee, au sujet de !'interdiction de l'acces d'un littoral, ou d'un 
port, au moyen de torpilles dormantes repandues devant le lieu qu'on 
veut bloquer. Ces torpilles, qui font explosion au contact des navires, 
s'opposent a !'entree dans les ports, ou ala sortie de ces ports, par tout 
batiment de guerre ou de commerce, neutre ou ennemi, et realisent un 
bloc1;1-s tres ahsolu, tres effectif. Ce n'est pas le blocus ordinaire et. 
regulier, ce n' est point le blocus effectif, tel que le definissaient les 
N eutralites armees de 1780 et 1800, ni meme la declaration d u congres 
de Paris de 1856, mais c'est un moyen de fermeture qui expose a un 
danger evident tout navire qui tenterait de la forcer, et qui ne pouvait 
etre vise avant !'invention et la vulgarisation des torpilles. Ces engins 
de guerre, dont l'usage est condamne par l'humanite, mais licite d'apres 
le droit international, pouvant etre disposes de maniere a constituer 
un investissement complet, il n'y a pas de raison determinante bien 
serieuse pour ne pas admettre les blocus au moyen de torpilles; 
d'autant plus que ce genre de blocus n'exclut pas, mais meme exige, 
la presence de navires de guerre, afin de concilier ce moyen de ferme-
ture avec la necessite generalement reconnue aujourd'hui d'une noti-
fication speciale faite en dehors de la notification diplomatique, pour 
surveiller les torpilles posees et pour les defendre contre les entreprises 
de l'ennemi bloque. Ce besoin de maintenir des navires de guerre 
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dans les parages ou les torpilles sont placees, enleve necessairement 
beaucoup d'avantages a cette maniere de bloquer, et l'on peut dire 
que si les blocus par torpilles sont possibles et licites, ce n' est que 
comme complement des blocus par navires. (8 Droit Int. Public. 
no. 3116.) 
La\vrence, speaking of the maintenance of blockade, 
says: 
But it is not necessary that channels should in every case be closed 
by ships, th ough a 1naritime blockade without vessels to support it 
would be a contradiction in terms. As an operation supplementary 
t o those of the fleet , a waterway may be closed by stones, sunken hulls, 
torpedoes, or other obstructions. When, in 1861, Earl Russell remon-
strated on behalf of the British Government against the attempt made 
by the Federal forces to block up some of the approaches to Charleston 
and Savannah by sinking vessels in the channels, Mr. Seward replied 
that the obstructions were only temporary and would be removed at 
t he termination of th e war. I n this particular case there was no inten-
tion to inflict pern1anent in jury upon "the com1nerce of nations and 
the free intercourse of the Southern States of America with the civil-
ized world." But even if such a design had been entertained, it is 
difficult to see on what grounds of law neuti:als could protest against it. 
A belligerent, who may knock the fortified ports of his enemy to pieces 
by bombardment if they resist his attack, may surely destroy the ap-
proaches to them from the sea in order to further the objects of his war. 
Neutrals are jealous, and properly jealous, of methods which inflict 
severe injury on· their trade; but they can hardly claim to make its 
future prosperity the measure of the legality of hostile acts. (Princi-
ples of lnt . Law, p . 583 .) 
Opinion o.f P rqfessor Lawrence on t~e Hague Conven-
tion.-Speaking of the convention in regard to the laying 
of submarine automatic contact mines, Professor Law-
rence says : 
Here we have a code which possesses the great advantage of being 
short, terse, and free from legal t echn icalities. But unfortunately 
th e first two articles are greatly diminished in force by a subsequent 
provision, and the third is useless. He must indeed be a curiously 
simple-minded naval commander who cannot think of smne other 
reason for laying a cordon of mines off an enemy's port than that of 
intercept ing commercial shipping. Even if there be no gunboat , how-
ever aged and rotten, reposing on the mud of some interior creek, or 
no naval store, however ill-furnished and depleted, hidden in some 
remote corner, there always remains the resource of alleging that the 
enemy's warships must be prevented frmn gaining the shelter of the 
harbour. Germany saw this and made a reservation against the regu-
lation on the ground that " the belligerent has only to assert a different 
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object in order to 1nake it illusory." One would have thought her next 
step would be to suggest that it be turned into a reality. But she ob-
jected to a British proposal to prohibit outright the use of contact 1nines 
for closing against cmnmerce ports that were not being attacked from 
the sea, and her opposition was backed by France and Russia. The 
result is that, so far as the conference is concerned, no restraint has 
been put on the activity of belligerents in this direction, though there 
is good reason for the assertion that it would be absolutely contrary 
to' existing International Law. (International Problmns and Hague 
Conferences, p. 122.) 
Just as a consideration of the law of contraband in conference 1nust 
lead to discussion on the carriage of food stuffs in neutral vessels to un-
blockaded belligerent ports, so it will be impossible to deal with the 
law of blockade without encountering the question of how a lawful 
blockade is constituted. For generations past there has been one cmn-
mon element in all the answers that have been given. vVithout excep-
tion they have asserted or assumed that the closure of the blockaded 
port must be effected by ships. There have been controversies as to 
the nun1ber of ships to be employed, the necessity of a cross fire being 
brought to bear from theni on any vessel attempting to enter, the mani-
fest nature of the danger threatened by them, and the question whether 
they must be ·stationed on the spot or may be allowed to cruise within 
reach of it. But no State has ever claimed the right to institute a 
blockade without placing some of its men-of-war in close proximity 
to the place blockaded. Yet at the last Hague Conference such a 
clai1n was made, not indeed directly, but by implication. The rejec-
tion of the British proposal to li1nit the use of anchored contact mines 
to the attack and defence of fortified naval· ports involved a belief in 
the right to use then1 for closing against commerce ports which were. 
not being attacked from the sea. A prohibition against laying them 
"off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercept-
ing conlme!·cial shipping" was indeed inserted in the convention on the 
subject, but we have already (see pp. 122, 123) exposed its futility. 
On this point the proceedings of the conference were reactionary in the 
highest degree. Whereas in the past the only way of closing an enemy's 
port against all neutral commerce was to blockade it, and the only way 
to blockade it was to station a ship or ships in such a position as to 
create evident danger to all vessels attempting ingress or egress, for 
the future it will suffice in the judgment of many powers, to lay a cor-
don of anchored contact mines across the approaches. Neutrals must 
indeed have lost all virility if they will quietly submit to this. It 
will not mean the comparative triviality of having their ships and 
goods confiscated by a belligerent Prize Court. They will be destroyed 
instead; and all on board will be sent to their doom. (Ibid., p. 189.) 
Dangers from the use of mines for blockade.-It is evi-
dent that there are many dangers from the use of mines 
in blockade. If notification is not given to every vessel 
112 BLOCKADING BY MINE~. 
approaching the line of blockade, vessels may run upon 
mines. It is usually admitted that a vessel mav occa-
sionally pass the line of blockade without being seen by 
the blockading forces, perhaps by reason of darkness or 
storm. Vessels may approach the line of blockade not 
knowing of its existence and innocently try to enter the 
port. Neutral public vessels may even when knowing 
of blockade approach the port. If in such a case, the 
blockading vessels are absent in pursuit of a vessel which 
has violated a blockade; are driven away by the stress 
of the weather; are driven away by the forces of the 
other belligerent, without ·removing the mine~, there 
remains a hidden danger to the vessels innocently ap-
proaching the port. A neutral attempting to violate a 
blockade, if captured, is liable, after trial by a proper court, 
to condemnation of vessel and cargo. A neutral vessel 
approaching, perhaps innocently, a port blockaded by 
mines, is liable to be destroyed without trial, and not 
. merely may the vessel and cargo be sunk but the lives of 
' the officers and crew Inay be sacrificed. 
A neutral coming within the area of actual hostilities 
is generally held liable to the consequences of his action. 
Therefore, a difference may be made in the means used in 
war in case the place blockaded is a military stronghold 
of the enemy. It :rpay be necessary that such places be 
closed to ingress or egress by mines. 
It seems, therefore, that there should be a distinction 
made in the use of mines for the purpose of closing ports, 
and that the use of mines for commercial blockades 
should not be allowed, or if allowed should be under very 
careful restrictions. 
However, the Hague Convention of 1907 only pro-
hibits the use of mines for "the sole object of intercepting 
commercial shipping." As has been said it is very easy 
to introduce an additional object for which a blockade is 
maintained while still leaving innocent shipping liable to 
gravest dangers. 
From the nature of the blockade, as stated in this 
Situation V, there is a small blockading force from which 
it might be inferred that it was rather a commercial than 
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a military blockade. The representatives of neutral 
States protest against the use of mines before the port. 
Protest would naturally not be lodged -against the use 
· of mines in any reasonable manner before a military 
stronghold. 
CONCLUSION . 
Under the strict law such use of mines is not pro-
hibited. It would seem, however, that mines should not 
be used for the maintenance of a commercial blockade 
and that neutrals would have good cause to protest 
against such use, which protest a belligerent should heed. 
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